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CASE NOTE

THE FUTURE OF GOVERNMENT-MANDATED HEALTH
WARNINGS AFTER R.J. REYNOLDS AND
AMERICAN MEAT INSTITUTE

BIANCA NUNES†
INTRODUCTION
Government-mandated disclosures and warnings aimed at promoting
public health are ubiquitous. Alcoholic beverage labels bear government
warnings against alcohol consumption during pregnancy.1 Both prescription
and over-the-counter drugs must comply with extensive Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) labeling requirements.2 Automobiles carry mandatory
safety rating labels.3 Cigarette packages have included warnings about the
dangers of smoking since 1965.4 Even chain restaurants must now follow the
federal nutrition labeling requirements that have applied to food packaging
for two decades. 5 Warnings and disclosure requirements are likely to
become even more widespread given President Obama’s 2011 executive
† Online Managing Editor, Volume 162, University of Pennsylvania Law Review. J.D., 2014,
University of Pennsylvania Law School; B.A., Brown University. Thank you to Professor Eric
Feldman for his guidance on writing this Note, and to the editors of the University of Pennsylvania
Law Review, particularly Jake Hartman and Margaret Zhang, for their work improving this piece.
All remaining errors are my own.
1 See generally 27 U.S.C. §§ 213–219a (2012) (setting forth alcoholic beverage labeling requirements).
2 See generally 21 C.F.R. pt. 201 (2014) (outlining labeling requirements for prescription and
over-the-counter drugs).
3 See 15 U.S.C. § 1232(g) (2012) (“Every manufacturer of new automobiles . . . shall . . . securely
affix . . . one or more safety ratings . . . .”); 49 C.F.R. §§ 575.301–302 (2013) (providing detailed
labeling guidance).
4 See Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-92, § 4, 79 Stat.
282, 283 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1333 (2012)) (requiring cigarette packages to include
the statement “Caution: Cigarette Smoking May Be Hazardous to Your Health”).
5 See infra note 99 and accompanying text.
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order encouraging administrative agencies to use these “[f]lexible
[a]pproaches” wherever “relevant, feasible, . . . consistent with regulatory
objectives, and . . . permitted by law.”6
Despite their widespread use as a regulatory tool, government-mandated
warnings and disclosures are not immune from legal challenge. In the 2012
case of R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
D.C. Circuit invalidated FDA’s graphic cigarette warnings on First
Amendment grounds. 7 The tobacco manufacturers’ challenge forced the
D.C. Circuit to wade into unchartered waters. Although there is a long line
of Supreme Court cases addressing First Amendment challenges to commercial speech restrictions (e.g., advertising bans), the Court has heard only
two challenges to commercial speech disclosure requirements, neither
involving government-mandated warnings.8 Further, while the Court has
been clear that it reviews commercial speech restrictions under the Central
Hudson intermediate scrutiny test,9 it has applied a standard akin to rational
basis review when examining purely factual disclosure requirements targeting
consumer deception, without explaining in what other circumstances
rational basis review would apply.10 Thus, faced with a novel question of
law, the R.J. Reynolds court concluded that the graphic cigarette warning
requirements did not merit rational basis review protection, because (1) they did
not seek to cure consumer deception and (2) they were not purely factual
and uncontroversial warnings, but rather “admonitions: ‘[D]on’t buy or use
this product.’”11 After deciding that Central Hudson intermediate scrutiny
6 Exec. Order No. 13,563, 76 Fed. Reg. 3821, 3822 ( Jan. 21, 2011).
7 696 F.3d 1205, 1222 (D.C. Cir. 2012), overruled in part by Am. Meat

Inst. v. USDA, 760 F.3d
18 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (en banc).
8 See generally infra Part I (discussing the Supreme Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence in
the commercial speech context, and citing Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service
Commission, 447 U.S. 557 (1980), and Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626 (1985),
as the sole Supreme Court cases addressing First Amendment challenges to commercial speech
disclosure requirements).
9 See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564 (“If the communication is neither misleading nor related to
unlawful activity, . . . [t]he State must assert a substantial interest to be achieved by restrictions on
commercial speech . . . , the regulatory technique must be in proportion to that interest[, and t]he
limitation on expression must be designed carefully to achieve the State’s goal.”).
10 See, e.g., infra note 47 and accompanying text.
11 R.J. Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1211-17. While disclosures and warnings are two different types of
government-mandated commercial speech, R.J. Reynolds did not indicate that warnings and
disclosures inherently deserve different levels of judicial scrutiny. This Note takes the position
that warnings and disclosures should not be treated differently: both may fulfill the First
Amendment’s goal of promoting the dissemination of information without burdening individual
liberty. Although there is a greater potential for a warning to cross the line into promoting an
ideological message (thus burdening the commercial speaker’s First Amendment rights), the type
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was the correct standard of review, the court held the warnings unconstitutional because FDA failed to produce sufficient evidence—indeed, “failed to
present any data”—that the warnings would directly and materially advance
its goal of reducing smoking rates.12 Although most commentators expected
the case to go to the Supreme Court,13 FDA instead withdrew the proposed
images and said it would issue revised graphic warnings.14
To the extent that R.J. Reynolds could be read as holding that only commercial speech mandates that are both purely factual and designed to
correct consumer deception receive rational basis review, it was overruled
by the 2014 en banc decision of the D.C. Circuit, American Meat Institute v.
USDA.15 Aligning the court’s position with that of other circuits, the D.C.
Circuit held in American Meat Institute that Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary
Counsel,16 the first Supreme Court case to apply rational basis review to a
government-mandated disclosure requirement, extended “beyond problems
of deception”—and thus applied to the U.S. Department of Agriculture
(USDA) country-of-origin disclosures at issue in the case.17
Given that the D.C. Circuit is responsible for reviewing many federal
agency regulations, American Meat Institute marks a significant victory for
regulators. A contrary holding—one limiting the protection of Zauderer
rational basis review to compelled speech aimed at curing deception—would
have threatened to unsettle the current regulatory regime, and would have

of warning at issue (e.g., one that simply provides information about potential harms, as compared
to one that goes further by admonishing consumers against buying a product) should be considered when determining whether the warning is purely factual and thus deserves rational basis
review.
12 Id. at 1217, 1220-22.
13 See, e.g., Richard Craver, Successful Appeal of Graphic Cigarette Labels Likely Headed for U.S.
Supreme Court, WINSTON-SALEM J. (Dec. 5, 2012, 5:52 PM), http://www.journalnow.com/news/
local/article_751e2000-3f2e-11e2-b08c-001a4bcf6878.html, archived at http://perma.cc/VX28-X5SH
(noting that the case appeared “destined” for Supreme Court review). Tobacco manufacturers’
facial challenge to the Tobacco Control Act’s graphic warning requirement failed in the Sixth
Circuit, and the Supreme Court denied the manufacturers’ petition for a grant of certiorari. See
Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v. United States, 674 F.3d 509, 569 (6th Cir. 2012) (“[T]he
Act’s warnings are reasonably related to the government’s interest in preventing consumer
deception and are therefore constitutional.”), cert. denied sub nom. Am. Snuff Co. v. United States,
133 S. Ct. 1996 (2013).
14 See Michael Felberbaum, U.S. to Revise Cigarette Warning Labels, NBC NEWS (Mar. 19,
2013, 2:27 PM), http://vitals.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/03/19/17375279-us-to-revise-cigarette-warninglabels, archived at http://perma.cc/ER7A-5U3Z (noting how FDA planned to “undertake research
to support a new rulemaking consistent with the Tobacco Control Act” (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
15 760 F.3d 18, 22-23 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (en banc).
16 471 U.S. 626 (1985).
17 Am. Meat Inst., 760 F.3d at 20.
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particularly threatened mandates aimed at promoting public health. These
disclosure requirements often do not target potentially deceptive commercial speech, and they rarely are supported by the level of evidence R.J.
Reynolds deemed necessary to satisfy Central Hudson intermediate scrutiny.18
(These evidentiary difficulties arise in part because many public health
problems are complex and cannot be eradicated by a disclosure requirement
alone.) While R.J. Reynolds raised important questions about the effectiveness
of disclosure requirements, the First Amendment should not be an
insurmountable obstacle when the commercial speaker’s constitutionally
protected interest is, as the Court has said, “minimal”19 and the government
interest is substantial.20
Although American Meat Institute lessened the blow R.J. Reynolds
dealt to regulators, both decisions left open important questions about
the First Amendment treatment of government-mandated warnings that
are neither “purely factual and uncontroversial”21 disclosures nor overt
government-sanctioned opinions, and about whether graphic cigarette
warnings belong in this middle ground. R.J. Reynolds only addressed the
constitutionality of the nine warnings before it, 22 and left unanswered
whether another graphic warning depicting the negative health consequences
of smoking could be constitutional. But, in characterizing FDA’s graphic
warnings as “a much different animal” than the mandated statements to
which the Supreme Court has previously applied rational basis review,23
and in viewing them as “intended to evoke an emotional response, or, at
most, shock the viewer into retaining the information in the text warning,”24
R.J. Reynolds strongly implied that no graphic cigarette warning could ever
receive rational basis review protection. Not only did the court seem to
demand Central Hudson intermediate scrutiny review for all governmentmandated graphic warnings, it created an overly burdensome intermediate
scrutiny test by misapplying the Administrative Procedure Act’s (APA)
18 See R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205, 1219 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (chastising
FDA for failing to produce “substantial evidence” supporting the effectiveness of its graphic
cigarette warnings), overruled in part by Am. Meat Inst. v. USDA, 760 F.3d 18 (D.C. Cir. 2014)
(en banc).
19 See Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651 (noting that a commercial speaker’s “constitutionally protected
interest in not providing any particular factual information in his advertising is minimal”).
20 See Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 485 (1995) (recognizing the government’s
substantial interest in “promoting the health, safety, and welfare of its citizens”).
21 R.J. Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1212 (quoting Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651).
22 See id. at 1209 (discussing FDA’s nine selected images).
23 Id. at 1216.
24 Id.
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“substantial evidence” standard to its First Amendment analysis, and by
failing to look beyond the Court’s abstract statements about Central Hudson
to its application of the test.25
Part I of this Note outlines the Supreme Court’s commercial speech
jurisprudence. It explains the Court’s differential treatment of commercial
speech restrictions and compelled commercial speech, and it outlines the
open question of whether Zauderer, and its accompanying rational basis
review protection, is limited to mandates aimed at correcting deception.
Part II discusses the various interpretations of Zauderer advanced by circuit
courts. It defends the broader interpretation of Zauderer adopted by the
First Circuit, Second Circuit, and, most recently, the D.C. Circuit in
American Meat Institute, and it criticizes the narrow interpretation articulated
in R.J. Reynolds. Part II likewise outlines the doctrinal support and policy
justifications for a broader interpretation of Zauderer, with particular focus
on the importance of recognizing the government’s interest in promoting
public health as worthy of rational basis review. Part III then looks at how
FDA could issue revised graphic cigarette warnings that would pass constitutional muster. It examines the type of graphic cigarette warnings that
could potentially merit review under the Zauderer standard, argues that R.J.
Reynolds misapplied the Central Hudson intermediate scrutiny standard,
suggests a better view of Central Hudson as applied to graphic cigarette
warnings, and describes post-Reynolds scientific research supporting the
effectiveness of graphic warnings.
I. COMMERCIAL SPEECH AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
Commercial speech received little First Amendment protection until
1976, when the Supreme Court first recognized pharmacists’ constitutional
right to advertise prescription drug prices in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy
v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.26 The Court declared that an
advertiser’s purely economic motive does not disqualify the advertiser from
First Amendment protection,27 and the Court emphasized the informative
value of commercial speech: a “consumer’s interest in the free flow of
commercial information . . . may be as keen, if not keener by far, than his
interest in the day’s most urgent political debate”;28 “society also may have
a strong interest in the free flow of commercial information”;29 and “the
25 See infra subsection III.C.2.
26 425 U.S. 748, 762 (1976).
27 Id.
28 Id. at 763.
29 Id. at 764.
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free flow of commercial information is indispensable” to making intelligent
and well-informed economic decisions.30 The First Amendment, the Court
held, did not permit the state to accomplish its goals “by keeping the public
in ignorance.”31 Yet the Court’s extension of First Amendment protection
to commercial speech32 was not without limits. The Court was careful to
emphasize that “[u]ntruthful speech, commercial or otherwise, has never
been protected,” and that the First Amendment “does not prohibit the State
from insuring that the stream of commercial information flow cleanly as
well as freely.” 33 It did not hold that commercial speech was “wholly
undifferentiable from other forms,” but instead suggested that the differences
between commercial and noncommercial speech justify a “different degree
of protection.”34 Since deciding that landmark case, the Court has clarified
that commercial speech receives a lesser degree of protection than noncommercial speech.35
Although the First Amendment protects both the right to speak freely
and the right not to speak,36 the Supreme Court has applied a more lenient
standard of review to commercial disclosure requirements than to commercial speech restrictions. The Court first articulated its test for commercial
speech restrictions when it invalidated New York City’s prohibition on
electric utility advertisements in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v.
Public Service Commission.37 Under Central Hudson intermediate scrutiny, a
law restricting nonmisleading commercial speech regarding a lawful
activity is constitutional only if it (1) is in furtherance of a substantial
government interest; (2) directly and materially advances that interest; and (3)
is not excessive.38
30 Id. at 765.
31 Id. at 770.
32 Commercial

speech is defined as speech that “does ‘no more than propose a commercial
transaction.’” Id. at 762 (quoting Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm’n on Human
Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 385 (1973)).
33 Id. at 771-72.
34 Id. at 771-72 n.24.
35 See, e.g., Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 563 (1980)
(noting that the Constitution “accords a lesser protection to commercial speech than to other
constitutionally guaranteed expression”). But see Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2664-68
(2011) (blurring the distinction between commercial and core First Amendment speech, but
ultimately applying Central Hudson intermediate scrutiny to invalidate Vermont’s restriction on
the sale, disclosure, and use of pharmacy records for purposes of prescription drug promotion).
36 Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977) (citing W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette,
319 U.S. 624, 633-34 (1943)).
37 447 U.S. at 564, 571.
38 Id. at 564.
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Five years later, in Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel,39 the Court
declined to extend Central Hudson. In Zauderer, the Court reviewed an Ohio
rule of professional conduct that required attorneys who advertised
contingency-fee services to disclose whether fees were calculated before or
after deduction of court expenses.40 Instead of applying Central Hudson
intermediate scrutiny, the Court applied rational basis review to uphold the
disclosure requirement. 41 The Court began its analysis by noting the
“material differences between disclosure requirements and outright prohibitions
on speech”: Ohio had not prevented attorneys from conveying information
to the public, but instead had merely “required them to provide somewhat
more information than they might otherwise be inclined to present.”42
Next, the Court contrasted the required disclosure with an attempt to
“prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other
matters of opinion,” and pointed to the First Amendment interest in
preserving the informational value commercial speech provides to consumers
to conclude that a commercial speaker’s “constitutionally protected interest
in not providing any particular factual information in his advertising is
minimal.”43 Finally, the Court noted its consistent position that “disclosure
requirements trench much more narrowly on an advertiser’s interests than
do flat prohibitions on speech,” and held that “an advertiser’s rights are
adequately protected as long as disclosure requirements are reasonably
related to the State’s interest in preventing deception of consumers.”44
Despite the widespread use of commercial speech disclosure requirements
as a regulatory tool, the Supreme Court has had few opportunities to
address when these requirements violate the First Amendment.45 Zauderer
made clear that a “purely factual” disclosure requirement aimed at dispelling
consumer deception should receive rational basis review protection but did
not say whether government-mandated disclaimers supporting other state
interests could as well.46 Although the Court addressed the constitutionality
of another disclosure requirement in 2010, the challenged law “share[d] the
39 471 U.S. 626 (1985).
40 Id. at 633.
41 See id. at 650-51 (requiring

only that the disclosure requirement be “reasonably related” to
the relevant government interest).
42 Id. at 650.
43 Id. at 651 (internal quotation marks omitted).
44 Id.
45 See generally Borgner v. Fla. Bd. of Dentistry, 537 U.S. 1080, 1082 (2002) (Thomas, J., dissenting
from denial of certiorari) (“Our decisions have not presumptively endorsed government-scripted
disclaimers or sufficiently clarified the nature and the quality of the evidence a State must present
to show that the challenged legislation directly advances the government interest asserted.”).
46 Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651.
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essential features” of the ethics rule at issue in Zauderer (they were both
purely factual disclosure requirements aimed at preventing consumer
deception), and thus the Court upheld the law without expounding on the
limits of Zauderer rational basis review.47 The Court’s silence left a circuit
split on the issue of whether Zauderer extends to government interests
other than the interest in preventing consumer deception,48 although that
split was arguably resolved by the 2014 D.C. Circuit decision in American
Meat Institute.49
II. AMERICAN MEAT INSTITUTE CORRECTLY OVERRULED R.J.
REYNOLDS BY ADOPTING A BROAD READING OF ZAUDERER
Commercial speech receives First Amendment protection for the informational value it provides to consumers, but this protection exists in the
context of the Supreme Court’s statements that a commercial speaker’s
protected interest in not providing factual information is “minimal.” 50
Given this backdrop, American Meat Institute correctly extended Zauderer
beyond mandates correcting deception.51 Not only would limiting Zauderer
to mandates curing consumer deception have cemented a circuit split, it also
would have created administrative complexity in situations where government

47 Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 1324,
48 Compare N.Y. State Rest. Ass’n v. N.Y.C. Bd. of Health, 556 F.3d

1339-40 (2010).
114, 133 (2d Cir. 2009)
(accepting a broader reading of Zauderer wherein it applies beyond consumer deception), and
Pharm. Case Mgmt. Ass’n v. Rowe, 429 F.3d 294, 310 n.8 (1st Cir. 2005) (“[W]e have found no
cases limiting Zauderer [to potentially deceptive advertising].”), with R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v.
FDA, 696 F.3d 1205, 1213 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (“[B]y its own terms, Zauderer’s holding is limited to
cases in which disclosure requirements are ‘reasonably related to the State’s interest in preventing
deception of consumers.’” (quoting Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651)), overruled in part by Am. Meat Inst.
v. USDA, 760 F.3d 18 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (en banc).
49 A petition for Supreme Court certiorari was recently denied in an unrelated case that raises
the same issue as American Meat Institute (whether Zauderer is limited to government mandates
requiring commercial speakers to disclose purely factual and uncontroversial information to
prevent deception). See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at i, Anthem Prescription Mgmt., LLC v.
Jerry Beeman & Pharmacy Servs., Inc., No. 14-0062 (U.S. July 17, 2014); Docket, No. 14-0062,
Anthem Prescription Mgmt., LLC v. Jerry Beeman & Pharmacy Servs., Inc., available at
http://www.supremecourt.gov/Search.aspx?FileName=/docketfiles/14-62.htm (last updated Nov.
10, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/7ZTE-BYST (denying certiorari on November 10, 2014). The
petitioner argued that “[t]he Fourth Circuit has also applied heightened scrutiny to laws compelling
speech by companies for purposes other than preventing consumer deception,” and that the Ninth
Circuit has held that “the First Amendment is inapplicable to laws requiring companies to engage
in factual speech.” Id. at 15, 19.
50 Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651.
51 See Am. Meat Inst., 760 F.3d at 20 (extending Zauderer’s applicability “beyond problems
of deception”).
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mandates reach both manufacturers who employ potentially deceptive
marketing practices and those who do not. Furthermore, limiting Zauderer’s
reach would have unsettled the current regulatory regime, in which
government-mandated disclosures and warnings serve other important
government interests but often do not target potential deception.
A. Doctrinal Support for Expanding Zauderer to Government Interests Other
than the Interest in Preventing Consumer Deception
The Supreme Court’s First Amendment commercial speech jurisprudence supports the American Meat Institute decision to extend Zauderer
beyond mandates correcting deception.
As an initial matter, R.J. Reynolds and American Meat Institute disagreed
about the extent to which the Supreme Court had ever addressed “whether
the principles articulated in Zauderer apply more broadly to factual and
uncontroversial disclosures required to serve . . . government interests
[other than preventing consumer deception].”52 Whereas American Meat
Institute read Zauderer as “not giv[ing] a clear answer,” 53 R.J. Reynolds
asserted that “by its own terms, Zauderer’s holding is limited to cases in
which disclosure requirements are ‘reasonably related to the State’s interest
in preventing deception of consumers.’”54 Likewise, while American Meat
Institute recognized ambiguity in the Court’s later application of Zauderer,55
R.J. Reynolds cited Supreme Court precedent it believed “establish[ed] that a
disclosure requirement is only appropriate if the government shows that,
absent a warning, there is a self-evident—or at least ‘potentially real’—
danger that an advertisement will mislead consumers.”56
R.J. Reynolds was correct when it stated that the Supreme Court has never extended Zauderer to disclosure requirements other than those correcting
misleading commercial speech,57 but the opinion mischaracterized the cases
it cited as actually addressing the issue.58 The only clear statement R.J.
52 Id. at 21.
53 Id.
54 R.J. Reynolds

Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205, 1213 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (quoting Zauderer,
471 U.S. at 651), overruled in part by Am. Meat Inst. v. USDA, 760 F.3d 18 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (en banc).
55 See Am. Meat Inst., 760 F.3d at 22 (noting that Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 1324 (2010), could be interpreted as “simply descriptive of the circumstances
to which the Court applied” Zauderer, or, alternatively, as “preclud[ing] any application beyond
those circumstances”).
56 R.J. Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1214 (quoting Ibanez v. Fla. Dep’t of Bus. & Prof ’l Regulation,
512 U.S. 136, 146 (1994)).
57 Id. at 1213.
58 See id. at 1213-14 (citing Milavetz, 130 S. Ct. at 1340; Ibanez, 512 U.S. at 136, 146; and Zauderer,
471 U.S. at 651-52).
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Reynolds provided for limiting the scope of Zauderer came from a dissenting
opinion, not binding precedent.59 No Justice speaking for the Court has
ever made such a declaration. Indeed, the Court has never had an opportunity to do so. It has never faced a purely factual speech mandate that
serves a government interest other than preventing consumer deception.
United States v. United Foods,60 which R.J. Reynolds cited as an example of
the Court’s unwillingness to extend Zauderer beyond curing consumer
deception,61 hardly makes a statement on the issue.62 The compelled speech
at issue in that case (an assessment charged on each mushroom produced or
imported to support advertisements promoting generic mushrooms) was
indisputably nonfactual.63 And, unlike R.J. Reynolds, United Foods contained
no assertions about Zauderer’s limits. The brief paragraph addressing
Zauderer merely distinguished United Foods in response to the argument that
the Court’s conclusions were inconsistent with its precedent.64 At best, United
Foods can be read as supporting the Court’s unwillingness to extend Zauderer
to mandates that share none of the characteristics of the mandated disclosure
upheld in Zauderer (i.e., mandates involving compelled speech that is neither
“purely factual” nor necessary to “prevent[] deception of consumers”).65
R.J. Reynolds’s next citation, to Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Public Utilities
Commission,66 when viewed in context, actually provides support for expanding
Zauderer beyond curing consumer deception. The passage the court cited
(“[n]othing in Zauderer . . . suggests that the State is equally free to require
[entities] to carry the messages of third parties, where the messages themselves
are biased against or are expressly contrary to the [entity’s] views”)67 merely
stands for the proposition that nonfactual, opinion-based compelled messages
59 See id. at 1213 (“Zauderer ‘carries no authority for a mandate unrelated to the interest in
avoiding misleading or incomplete commercial messages.’” (quoting Glickman v. Wileman Bros.
& Elliott, Inc., 521 U.S. 457, 491 (1997) (Souter, J., dissenting))).
60 533 U.S. 405 (2001).
61 R.J. Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1213.
62 See N.Y. State Rest. Ass’n v. N.Y.C. Bd. of Health, 556 F.3d 114, 133 (2d Cir. 2009) (“We
think [the appellant] reads too much into United Foods. The paragraph on which [the appellant]
relies simply distinguishes Zauderer . . . ; it does not provide that all other disclosure requirements
are subject to heightened scrutiny.”).
63 See United Foods, 533 U.S. at 411 (“The message [of the mandatory subsidies for mushroom
advertisements] is that mushrooms are worth consuming whether or not they are branded.”).
64 Id. at 416; see also N.Y. State Rest. Ass’n, 556 F.3d at 133 (asserting that United Foods “does
not provide that all other disclosure requirements [that are not necessary to prevent consumer
deception] are subject to heightened scrutiny”).
65 Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985).
66 475 U.S. 1 (1986) (plurality opinion).
67 R.J. Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1213-14 (quoting Pacific Gas, 475 U.S. at 16 n.12).
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do not receive rational basis review. The preceding sentence of Pacific Gas,
which R.J. Reynolds omitted, had suggested a broad government power to
require factual disclosures from commercial speakers: “The State, of course,
has substantial leeway in determining appropriate information disclosure
requirements for business corporations.”68
R.J. Reynolds also overstated the significance of the final two Supreme
Court cases it cited. Ibanez v. Florida Department of Business & Professional
Regulation69 does not so much “suggest[] that Zauderer should be construed
to apply only when the government affirmatively demonstrates that an
advertisement threatens to deceive consumers”;70 rather, it simply affirms
that the government cannot rely exclusively on bare allegations of consumer
deception to justify a speech restriction. The action by the Florida Board of
Accountancy at issue in Ibanez (punishing an attorney for advertising her
Certified Financial Planner (CFP) designation)71 is a speech restriction, not
a disclosure requirement, thus rational basis review was never an option.72
Moreover, the Florida Board’s only justification for its actions was that the
attorney’s speech was “inherently mislead[ing]” or “potentially misleading.”73
Ibanez certainly makes a statement about the level of evidence required to
show actual or potential deception sufficient to justify a commercial speech
restriction,74 but it says nothing about other government interests.
The final case cited by R.J. Reynolds, Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v.
United States, addressed a disclosure requirement that “share[d] the essential
features of the rule at issue in Zauderer,”75 and thus took no position on
expanding Zauderer,76 as noted in Part I.77
R.J. Reynolds and American Meat Institute also differed in the degree to
which Zauderer’s rationale influenced their interpretations of Zauderer. R.J.
Reynolds failed to reconcile its analysis with Zauderer’s declaration that a
68 Pacific Gas, 475 U.S. at 15-16 n.12 (citing Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651).
69 512 U.S. 136 (1994).
70 R.J. Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1214.
71 Ibanez, 512 U.S. at 138-39.
72 See supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text.
73 Ibanez, 512 U.S. at 144, 146.
74 See id. at 145.
75 130 S. Ct. 1324, 1339-40 (2010).
76 But see id. at 1343-44 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring

in the judgment)
(questioning the different treatment of commercial speech restrictions and mandates, expressing a
willingness to “reexamine Zauderer and its progeny in an appropriate case,” and arguing that
compelled speech is constitutional only where the targeted advertisement is “inherently likely to
deceive” (quoting In re R. M. J., 455 U.S. 191, 202 (1982) (emphasis added))).
77 See supra note 47 and accompanying text; cf. Am. Meat Inst. v. USDA, 760 F.3d 18, 22
(D.C. Cir. 2014) (en banc) (noting Milavetz’s susceptibility to multiple interpretations regarding
the scope of Zauderer).
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commercial speaker’s “protected interest in not providing any particular
factual information in his advertising is minimal.”78 American Meat Institute,
on the other hand, pointed to Zauderer’s core reasoning to support a broader
application of rational basis review. First, the court noted that Zauderer
rejected the Central Hudson test because of the “material differences between
disclosure requirements and outright prohibitions on speech.”79 Next, the
court pointed to Zauderer’s description of “the First Amendment interests
implicated by disclosure requirements” as “substantially weaker than those
at stake when speech is actually suppressed.” 80 The court quoted from
Zauderer once more81 before concluding that “Zauderer’s characterization of
the speaker’s interest in opposing forced disclosure of [purely factual and
uncontroversial] information as ‘minimal’ seems inherently applicable
beyond the problem of deception, as other circuits have found.”82
While Judge Brown’s dissent in American Meat Institute accused the
majority of “hing[ing] its claims on just three scraps from Zauderer,”83 a
complete examination of Zauderer and its historical context does not support
Judge Brown’s conclusion that “the state’s option to require a curative
disclosure cannot be disconnected from its right to entirely prohibit deceptive,
fraudulent, or misleading commercial speech.”84 When the Supreme Court
extended formal constitutional protection to commercial speech, the Court
did note that untruthful speech remained unprotected, but the bulk of the
Court’s analysis (and its primary justification) was the informational value
of commercial speech to consumers 85 —a justification in line with the
language American Meat Institute cited from Zauderer. Further, the Zauderer
language the majority cited is hardly “three scraps.” On the contrary, it is a
fair representation of the Court’s analysis of Ohio’s disclosure requirement.86

78 Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985); cf. R.J. Reynolds
Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205, 1213-15 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (discussing Zauderer without
mentioning this statement), overruled in part by Am. Meat Inst. v. USDA, 760 F.3d 18 (D.C. Cir.
2014) (en banc).
79 Am. Meat Inst., 760 F.3d at 22 (quoting Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 650).
80 Id. (quoting Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 652 n.14).
81 See id. (“Because the extension of First Amendment protection to commercial speech is
justified principally by the value to consumers of the information such speech provides, appellant’s
constitutionally protected interest in not providing any particular factual information in his
advertising is minimal.” (quoting Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651 (citation omitted))).
82 Id.
83 Id. at 38 (Brown, J., dissenting).
84 Id. at 39-40.
85 See supra notes 28-31 and accompanying text.
86 See generally Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 650-53; see also supra notes 39-44 and accompanying text.
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Although neither American Meat Institute nor R.J. Reynolds showed how
their respective readings of Zauderer would promote First Amendment goals,
the Second Circuit did in the 2001 case of National Electrical Manufacturers
Ass’n v. Sorrell.87 To support its expanded reading of Zauderer, the Second
Circuit pointed to “the core First Amendment values of promoting efficient
exchange of information [and] protecting individual liberty,” reasoning that
“mandated disclosure of accurate, factual, commercial information . . .
furthers, rather than hinders,” these values. 88 Requiring disclosure of
truthful information adds to the “marketplace of ideas” without infringing
on individual liberty, the court explained. 89 Whereas state-mandated
personal or political speech impairs individual liberty, requiring commercial
speakers to disclose accurate factual information “presents little risk that the
state is forcing speakers to adopt disagreeable state-sanctioned positions,
suppressing dissent, confounding the speaker’s attempts to participate in
self-governance, or interfering with an individual’s right to define and
express his or her own personality.”90 The court recognized that compelled
disclosures could invoke privacy and property concerns but reasoned that
rational basis review was still appropriate: courts afford less weight to privacy
concerns in the commercial setting, and the common law of property and other
constitutional rights adequately protect commercial speakers’ “legally cognizable
interest in withholding accurate, factual information.”91
Expanding Zauderer’s reach to cases involving government interests besides
curing consumer deception is consistent with recent Supreme Court precedent,
notwithstanding the success of recent First Amendment challenges to commercial speech restrictions. Some may find it troubling that, in an era when the
Supreme Court has given increasing deference to commercial speech, both
the D.C. Circuit (in American Meat Institute) and the Second Circuit (in
National Electrical Manufacturers Ass’n) failed to identify a Supreme Court
decision other than Zauderer—which is now nearly 30 years old—to support
extending the protection of rational basis review beyond preventing

87 272 F.3d 104 (2d Cir. 2001). In National Electrical Manufacturers Ass’n, the Second Circuit
extended Zauderer to a commercial speech mandate designed to “protect[] human health and the
environment from mercury poisoning.” Id. at 115. The Vermont statute at issue required manufacturers of mercury-containing light bulbs to use packaging labels to inform buyers about the light
bulbs’ mercury content and about the need to recycle or dispose of the light bulbs as hazardous
waste. Id. at 107 & n.1.
88 Id. at 114.
89 Id.
90 Id.
91 Id.
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deception. 92 While the Court has been more protective of commercial
speech in recent years, this trend has merely responded to speech restrictions—
without handicapping regulators’ ability to require disclosures. In Milavetz—the
only purely factual disclosure requirement to come before the Court in the
three decades since Zauderer—the Court applied Zauderer’s lenient standard
of review, implying that Zauderer’s core reasoning still holds strong.93
Moreover, the Court has justified its heightened skepticism of commercial
speech restrictions with reference to the informational value that commercial
speech provides to consumers: “The First Amendment directs us to be
especially skeptical of regulations that seek to keep people in the dark for
what the government perceives to be their own good.”94 This reasoning is
consistent with Zauderer and supports a more lenient review of all factual
disclosure requirements, which seek to apprise people of important
information—not keep them in the dark.
Neither the D.C. Circuit’s nor the Second Circuit’s opinion seems, however,
to fully appreciate how crucial a broad reading of Zauderer is to the current
regulatory regime, particularly for protecting government-mandated speech
aimed at promoting public health.95 The following Section explores the
impact that R.J. Reynolds’s narrow reading of Zauderer would have had on
public health disclosure requirements, including those for which there is
widespread public support.
B. The Undesirable Policy Implications of Limiting Zauderer Rational Basis
Review to Mandates Curing Deception
The current regulatory regime was predicated on the logic of Zauderer:
that a commercial speaker’s right not to disclose factual information is
“minimal,” not fundamental,96 and that regulatory bodies can therefore chip
away at serious public health problems through purely factual disclosures
and warnings. These regulatory tools are meant to be a less burdensome

92 See generally Am. Meat Inst. v. USDA, 760 F.3d 18, 20-27 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (en banc); Nat’l
Elec. Mfrs. Ass’n, 272 F.3d at 113-16.
93 See supra notes 47, 75-77 and accompanying text.
94 Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2671 (2011) (quoting 44 Liquormart, Inc. v.
Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 503 (1996) (plurality opinion)).
95 Cf. Jennifer M. Keighley, Can You Handle the Truth? Compelled Commercial Speech and the
First Amendment, 15 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 539, 565 (2012) (asserting that failing to extend Zauderer
rational basis review could have drastic policy implications for the use of disclosure requirements
as a regulatory strategy).
96 Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985).
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alternative to legislation that would intrude more on individual liberty.97
(Note that these regulatory tools typically still receive the protection of
rational basis review, unless they implicate a fundamental right.)98 If the
Supreme Court ever adopts the R.J. Reynolds approach, however, legislators
and regulators might have to abandon disclosures and warnings in favor of
more onerous, intrusive, and paternalistic measures to promote public health.
Because many government speech mandates target both commercial
speakers employing deceptive practices and commercial speakers who do
not,99 under R.J. Reynolds’s restrictive reading of Zauderer, the same commercial
speech regulation could be reviewed using different levels of scrutiny
depending on the challenger or the context.100 Not only would R.J. Reynolds’s
regime create increased complexity for courts and regulators, but it could
97 See Exec. Order No. 13,563, 76 Fed. Reg. 3821, 3821 ( Jan. 21, 2011) (noting that the regulatory system should use the “least burdensome tools for achieving regulatory ends”).
98 See, e.g., Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. von Eschenbach,
495 F.3d 695, 712-13 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (en banc) (applying rational basis review to FDA’s policy
limiting access to investigational drugs, a policy intended to protect patients from potentially
unsafe drugs, because there is no fundamental right to experimental drugs).
99 Nutrition labeling laws are one example of mandates that sometimes target deceptive practices, but more often serve other important purposes. For over two decades the Federal Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) has required food packaging for “food intended for human
consumption . . . and offered for sale” to contain a label listing the product’s caloric content and
other key nutritional information. See Nutrition Labeling and Education Act of 1990, Pub. L. No.
101-535, § 2(a), 104 Stat. 2353, 2353 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 343(q)(1) (2012))
(amending the FDCA and requiring nutrition labeling requirements). In 2010, the FDCA labeling
requirements were extended to cover chain retail food establishments, which must now display
calorie information for standard menu items. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub.
L. No. 111-148, § 4205(b), 124 Stat. 119, 573-76 (2010) (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 343(q)(5)(H) (2012))
(amending the FDCA by requiring restaurants and similar retail food establishments that are “part
of a chain with 20 or more locations” to “disclose in a clear and conspicuous manner . . . the
number of calories contained in [a] standard menu item”).
To be sure, certain food industry practices arguably create the potential for consumer deception. See generally BD. OF HEALTH, N.Y.C. DEP’T OF HEALTH & MENTAL HYGIENE,
NOTICE OF ADOPTION OF A RESOLUTION TO REPEAL AND REENACT § 81.50 OF THE NEW
YORK CITY HEALTH CODE 5-7 (2008) (“The systematic underestimation of calories suggests
that consumers have distorted perceptions of calorie content and de facto have been misled to view
oversized, high-calorie portions as ‘normal’ portions, containing acceptable numbers of calories.”).
The 2010 federal menu labeling law, however, stretches beyond curing potential deception. It
applies to chain restaurants regardless of whether their advertisements might mislead consumers
and regardless of whether their food is considered “unhealthy.” It covers any “restaurant or
similar retail food establishment” that is “part of a chain with 20 or more locations,” 21 U.S.C.
§ 343(q)(5)(H)(i)—a class of food establishments that includes the salad chain Sweetgreen, as well
as traditional “fast food” restaurants.
100 See R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205, 1212 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (describing
the Central Hudson test, which is used to review government-mandated restrictions on noncommercial speech, as “significantly more stringent than Zauderer’s standard”), overruled in part by Am.
Meat Inst. v. USDA, 760 F.3d 18 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (en banc).
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also (partially) invalidate many government-mandated disclosures and
warnings, especially those with the ambitious goal of promoting public health.
R.J. Reynolds’s limited application of Zauderer would be particularly
troubling for public health regulators seeking to use disclosures or warnings
for purposes other than preventing deception, because it declares that the
regulators must first gather mountains of evidence.101 Given the severity of
many public health problems and health’s paramount importance in our
daily lives, public health law is an area where regulatory bodies cannot
afford to wait for airtight evidence before they act. A regulatory agency
tasked with disease prevention and health promotion does not serve its
purpose by delaying action until it can accumulate the level of evidence that
R.J. Reynolds interprets Central Hudson to require.102 Moreover, the complexity of public health problems makes confounding factors nearly inevitable
in any proposed intervention and makes it difficult if not impossible to
provide the evidence that R.J. Reynolds requires.
As the Supreme Court noted in Zauderer, “[a]s a general matter, governments are entitled to attack problems piecemeal, save where their
policies implicate rights so fundamental that strict scrutiny must be applied.
The right of a commercial speaker not to divulge accurate information
regarding his services is not such a fundamental right.”103 Given the myriad
factors that influence health and wellness, public health is an area where it is
especially necessary to have the flexibility to take a piecemeal approach.
Indeed, legislatures frequently choose to attack complex public health
problems through multiple channels.104
While a simple disclosure requirement may not directly and materially
advance an ambitious public health goal such as reducing obesity, evidence
that it might directly improve the health of some individuals105 should be
enough to justify a mandate that poses a “minimal” burden to a commercial

101 See id. at 1221 (“Central Hudson requires FDA to find and present data supporting its
claims prior to imposing a burden on commercial speech.”).
102 R.J. Reynolds’s misapplication of Central Hudson is discussed at length later in this Note.
See infra subsection III.C.2.
103 Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 652 n.14 (1985) (citation omitted).
104 See generally, e.g., ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON F OUND., IMPACT OF MENU LABELING
ON CONSUMER BEHAVIOR: A 2008–2012 UPDATE 8 (2013), available at http://www.rwjf.org/
content/dam/farm/reports/reports/2013/rwjf406357, archived at http://perma.cc/HKB9-2HYN (“Menu
labeling is only one of many interventions to reduce energy intake and should be viewed in the
context of a broader set of strategies.”).
105 See, e.g., id. at 3, 5 (explaining that menu labeling “may have a greater effect on women
than men, on higher-calorie items, and among certain types of restaurant chains”).
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speaker’s First Amendment rights 106 and empowers consumers to make
healthier choices without dictating how they should live their lives.107 This
approach should be further supported because many alternatives (e.g.,
directly limiting the types of foods or portion sizes restaurants can serve)
would greatly intrude on individual liberty yet still receive rational basis
review—because the freedom to consume whatever food one wants is not a
fundamental right. Yet R.J. Reynolds’s approach would have the interest
balancing come out the other way, favoring the commercial speaker over
public health whenever the government’s interest is something other than
preventing deception.
Granted, intuition alone should not be enough to support a disclosure
requirement, but the proper guarantor of good regulation is the Administrative
Procedure Act, not the First Amendment. American Meat Institute recognized the limited role that First Amendment rights should play in challenges
to required disclosures of purely factual and uncontroversial information
about commercial speakers’ products.108 But despite how American Meat
Institute extends Zauderer beyond disclosure requirements that seek to
prevent consumer deception, R.J. Reynolds still looms as a formidable
obstacle to the viability of graphic cigarette warnings as a successful
anti-tobacco regulatory tool. The next Part explores R.J. Reynolds’s reasoning
used to invalidate FDA’s nine graphic cigarette warnings, and it provides
recommendations for how FDA could propose graphic warnings that
would overcome a future First Amendment challenge while still reducing
tobacco consumption.
III. A GRAPHIC CIGARETTE WARNING THAT COULD SURVIVE
A FIRST AMENDMENT CHALLENGE
Although the D.C. Circuit has now partially overruled R.J. Reynolds and
extended Zauderer beyond mandates curing consumer deception, R.J.
Reynolds still poses a difficult—if arguably surmountable—obstacle to
graphic cigarette warnings as an anti-smoking regulatory tool. While
challenging, it is possible to create a future graphic warning that would
receive rational basis review protection. Moreover, a future court’s conclusion that Central Hudson, not Zauderer, provides the correct level of scrutiny
would not be fatal to the graphic warnings: R.J. Reynolds arguably
misapplied Central Hudson, and scientific research conducted post–R.J.
106 Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651.
107 See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
108 See Am. Meat Inst. v. USDA, 760 F.3d 18,

“minimal” First Amendment rights at issue).

22 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (en banc) (discussing the
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Reynolds provides additional support for graphic warnings’ effectiveness in
reducing tobacco consumption.
A. Background: The Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act,
R.J. Reynolds, and American Meat Institute
The Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act (Tobacco
Control Act) grants FDA the authority to regulate the manufacture and sale
of tobacco products. 109 The Tobacco Control Act makes it illegal to
“manufacture, package, sell, offer to sell, distribute, or import” cigarettes
without one of nine graphic warnings on the cigarette labels.110 The required
graphic warnings contain two components: a textual warning and an
associated graphic image. The Act lists the nine potential textual warnings111
and directs FDA to “issue regulations that require color graphics depicting
the negative health consequences of smoking to accompany the [textual
warning] statements.”112 The graphic warnings are meant to be noticed: they
must “comprise the top 50 percent of the front and rear panels” of cigarette
packages113 and must “comprise at least 20 percent of the area” of each
cigarette advertisement.114 In its final rulemaking (the one at issue in R.J.
Reynolds), FDA selected nine graphic images, as required by the Tobacco
Control Act.115 But FDA then went one step further and required each
graphic warning to list the “1-800-QUIT-NOW” tobacco cessation hotline,
a measure which it believed was “appropriate for the protection of the
public health” in accordance with its authority under § 906(d) of the
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA).116

109 Pub. L. No. 111-31, sec. 101(b), § 901, 123 Stat. 1776, 1786-87 (2009) (codified at 21
U.S.C. § 387a (2012)).
110 Id. sec. 201, § 4(a)(1), (d), 123 Stat. at 1842-43, 1845 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1333(a)(1), (d) (2012)).
111 Id. sec. 201, § 4(a)(1), 123 Stat. at 1842-43 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1333(a)(1)).
112 Id. sec. 201, § 4(a)(d), 123 Stat. at 1845 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1333(d)).
113 Id. sec. 201, § 4(a)(2), 123 Stat. at 1843 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1333(a)(2)).
114 Id. sec. 201, § 4(b)(2), 123 Stat. at 1843 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1333(b)(2)).
115 Required Warnings for Cigarette Packages and Advertisements, 76 Fed. Reg. 36,628,
36,674, 36,753-54 ( June 22, 2011) (codified at 12 C.F.R. §§ 1141.10, 1141.12).
116 Id. at 36,680-81, 36,754-55 (codified at 12 C.F.R. § 1141.16); see also Family Smoking
Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, sec. 101(b), § 906(d), 123 Stat. at 1796-97 (codified at 21
U.S.C. § 387f(d) (2012)) (adding section 906(d) to the FDCA so that “[t]he Secretary [of Health
& Human Services] may by regulation require restrictions on the sale and distribution of a
tobacco product . . . if the Secretary determines that such regulation would be appropriate for the
protection of the public health”).
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Although FDA’s rulemaking cited research findings from other countries
that had implemented similar graphic warning requirements,117 when tobacco
manufacturers brought a First Amendment suit against the rulemaking in
the D.C. Circuit, the R.J. Reynolds court concluded that FDA had presented
insufficient evidence of the warnings’ effectiveness to pass Central Hudson
intermediate scrutiny review.118 The court thus held that the nine graphic
warnings violated tobacco manufacturers’ First Amendment rights.119
The R.J. Reynolds court gave two reasons for applying Central Hudson
instead of Zauderer. First, the court pointed to the Tobacco Control Act’s ban
on certain advertisement practices and to “the absence of any congressional
findings on the misleading nature of cigarette packaging itself ” to conclude
that cigarette advertisements are not potentially misleading. 120 Second,
according to the court, the graphic warnings were not purely factual: “many
of the images chosen by FDA could be misinterpreted by consumers” who
might think they suggest typical outcomes of smoking, and the images were
“primarily intended to evoke an emotional response, or, at most, shock the
viewer into retaining the information in the text warning.” 121 After its
defeat in the D.C. Circuit, FDA withdrew its nine graphic warnings and
announced its intent to submit revised graphic cigarette warnings.122
Two years later in American Meat Institute, the D.C. Circuit readdressed
Zauderer’s scope after a meat industry trade association brought a First
Amendment challenge to a USDA regulation requiring meat products to
carry labels indicating the country where the animal was born, raised, and
slaughtered.123 The court, sitting en banc, held “that Zauderer in fact does
reach beyond problems of deception,” and overruled R.J. Reynolds to the
extent that it could be read as limiting Zauderer to disclosure requirements
aimed at correcting deception.124 Next, the court applied Zauderer, starting
with an assessment of the adequacy of the interest motivating the
country-of-origin disclosure requirement.125 The court acknowledged that
Zauderer “gives little indication of what type of interest might suffice” and
noted that the Supreme Court has not clarified whether Zauderer would
117 R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205, 1209-10 & 1209 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 2012),
overruled in part by Am. Meat Inst. v. USDA, 760 F.3d 18 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (en banc).
118 Id. at 1217-21; see also infra subsection III.C.1 (discussing how the evidence from other
countries was weakened by confounding factors).
119 R.J. Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1222.
120 Id. at 1214-15.
121 Id. at 1216.
122 See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
123 Am. Meat Inst. v. USDA, 760 F.3d 18, 20-21 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (en banc).
124 Id. at 20-23.
125 Id. at 23.
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allow government reliance on interests that do not qualify as “substantial”
under Central Hudson.126 Ultimately, the court did not decide whether a
lesser interest would suffice, because it determined that the interest supporting
the country-of-origin labeling requirement was indeed “substantial.”127
After its analysis of the relationship between the government’s disclosure
requirement and stated interest, the D.C. Circuit went on to explain that
the factors triggering Zauderer were “either unchallenged or substantially
unchallenged.”128 The required disclosures were clearly factual, and as such
they were “directly informative of intrinsic characteristics of the product
[the American Meat Institute members are] selling.”129 Further, the disclosure
was not “controversial”: (1) although the word “slaughter” “might convey a
certain innuendo,” the regulation allowed retailers to use the unobjectionable
term “harvested” instead; and (2) the labeling did not communicate “a
message that is controversial for some reason other than dispute about
simple factual accuracy”—such as a message “so one-sided or incomplete”
that it is not “factual and uncontroversial.”130 Nor did the requirement force
“corporations to carry the messages of third parties, where the messages
themselves are biased against or are expressly contrary to the corporation’s
views.”131 Finally, the disclosure was not “so burdensome that it essentially
operates as a restriction on constitutionally protected speech.”132 Accordingly,
the D.C. Circuit upheld the USDA country-of-origin disclosure requirements.133
B. Could a Future Graphic Cigarette Warning Receive
Rational Basis Review Protection?
Now that the D.C. Circuit has extended Zauderer beyond mandates curing
deception, FDA’s asserted interest in the graphic cigarette warnings
(reducing smoking rates) will undoubtedly qualify as an interest adequate to
trigger application of the Zauderer standard. Although American Meat
Institute did not decide whether a less-than-“substantial” government

126 Id.
127 Id. at 23-26.
128 Id. at 27.
129 Id.
130 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
131 Id. (quoting Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v.

(plurality opinion)).
132 Id.
133 Id.

Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 475 U.S. 1, 16 n.12 (1986)
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interest would suffice, even R.J. Reynolds conceded that reducing smoking
rates was a substantial government interest.134
R.J. Reynolds, however, appeared to make a strong statement against
finding any graphic cigarette warning “purely factual and uncontroversial,”
and there is little in American Meat Institute to temper this analysis.135 The
R.J. Reynolds court concluded that FDA’s original nine graphic warnings
were not purely factual: “many of the images chosen by FDA could be
misinterpreted by consumers” who might think they suggest typical outcomes
of smoking, and the images were primarily “intended to evoke an emotional
response, or, at most, shock the viewer into retaining the information in the
text warning.”136
FDA might overcome this significant obstacle (the nonfactual nature of
its required warnings) with a two-step strategy: select unenhanced images
that clearly and directly depict the associated textual warnings without the
need for consumer extrapolation, and then persuade the reviewing court to
view R.J. Reynolds’s logic as heavily influenced by the particular graphic
images before the R.J. Reynolds court at the time.
To rebut the D.C. Circuit’s worry about potential misinterpretation,
FDA could presumably present evidence that consumers do not actually
interpret images like “a man smoking through a tracheotomy hole”137 as
typical outcomes of smoking. In this manner, FDA could overcome the
argument that its selected images are easily misinterpreted and thus nonfactual.138 Better yet, FDA could select images that do not “require[] significant
extrapolation on the part of the consumers”139—i.e., images that directly
134 R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205, 1218 (D.C. Cir. 2012), overruled in part
by Am. Meat Inst. v. USDA, 760 F.3d 18 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (en banc); see also Rubin v. Coors
Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 485 (1995) (recognizing the government’s substantial interest in
“promoting the health, safety, and welfare of its citizens”).
135 See supra notes 128-130 and accompanying text. The D.C. Circuit soon will have the
opportunity to clarify the meaning of “purely factual and uncontroversial information.” In the
recent case of National Ass’n of Manufacturers v. SEC, the court granted SEC’s petition for panel
rehearing and ordered the parties to file supplemental briefs addressing multiple questions left
unresolved by Zauderer and American Meat Institute. Order Granting Petition for Panel Rehearing,
Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. SEC, No. 13-0635 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 18, 2014). One such question is the
meaning of “purely factual and uncontroversial information” as used in Zauderer and American
Meat Institute. Id.
136 R.J. Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1216.
137 Id.
138 While FDA could add disclaimers (e.g., “smoking through a tracheotomy hole is not a
common consequence of smoking”), these disclaimers would defeat the entire purpose of the
warnings: the warnings are meant to correct people’s underestimation of the risk smoking poses to
them personally. See id. at 1228 (Rogers, J., dissenting) (noting that “many smokers underestimate
their personal risks” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
139 Id. at 1216 (majority opinion).
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depict the accompanying textual warnings. Because such images are less
prone to misinterpretation, a court will more likely accept them as “purely
factual” and therefore worthy of Zauderer rational basis review. 140
Further, consumers with lower levels of education are more likely to
remember health messages that include graphics directly correlating with
accompanying text.141
The larger obstacle, however, will be rebutting R.J. Reynolds’s concern
about FDA’s “tacit admission” that the graphic warnings are “primarily
intended to evoke an emotional response” or “shock the viewer into retaining
the information in the text warning.” 142 R.J. Reynolds drew this “tacit
admission” from two assertions in FDA’s brief: (1) research shows “pictures
are easier to remember than words” and (2) “emotional responses, such as
worry and disgust, reliably predict the likelihood that consumers will
understand and appreciate the substance of the warnings.”143
A court should not, however, interpret the D.C. Circuit’s language as
holding that all images are inherently beyond Zauderer’s scope. FDA’s
graphic images may be “a much different animal” than the mandates at issue
in Zauderer and Milavetz,144 but “Zauderer itself eviscerates the argument
that a picture or drawing cannot be accurate and factual.”145 As the Sixth
Circuit explained in its analysis upholding the constitutionality of the
Tobacco Control Act in Discount Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v. United States,
the Zauderer Court rejected the argument that illustrations by attorneys
create “unacceptable risks that the public will be misled, manipulated, or
confused,” and noted the important communicative functions of pictures:
they attract the attention of the audience and impart information directly.146
If the Supreme Court in Zauderer pointed to pictures’ informative function
as a reason to grant First Amendment protection to images in commercial

140 See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985) (endorsing
rational basis review of government-mandated disclosures involving “purely factual and uncontroversial information”).
141 See generally Julie C. LaVille, Note, A Warning Worth a Thousand Words: First Amendment
Challenges to the FDA’s Graphic Warning Label Requirements, 58 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 243, 262 (2013)
(explaining how textual warnings “require a college reading level” and graphic warnings would
facilitate comprehension by individuals across educational levels (internal quotation marks omitted)).
142 R.J. Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1216.
143 Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
144 Id.
145 Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v. United States, 674 F.3d 509, 560 (6th Cir. 2012),
cert. denied sub nom Am. Snuff Co. v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1996 (2013).
146 Id. (quoting Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 648 (1985)).
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speech, then the use of graphics in cigarette warnings to impart health risk
information effectively should not bar rational basis review protection.
As for the R.J. Reynolds court’s contention that images evoking negative
emotional responses are nonfactual, FDA can make a good case that a future
court should abandon this reasoning. As the R.J. Reynolds dissent astutely
noted, the R.J. Reynolds argument “leads to the counterintuitive conclusion
that the more concerning the negative health effects of a particular product,
the more constrained the government is in mandating disclosures of those
facts.”147 The reasoning of Discount Tobacco is equally persuasive:
Facts can disconcert, displease, provoke an emotional response, spark
controversy, and even overwhelm reason, but that does not magically turn
such facts into opinions. . . . [W]hether a disclosure is scrutinized under
Zauderer turns on whether the disclosure conveys factual information or an
opinion, not on whether the disclosure emotionally affects its audience or
incites controversy.148

Further, this reasoning is consistent with American Meat Institute’s inquiry
into whether the required country-of-origin labels were “biased against or . . .
expressly contrary to the corporation’s views” (because only an affirmative
answer would merit heightened scrutiny) and with its characterization of
“slaughter” as “a plain, blunt word for a plain, blunt action” (providing an
accurate statement of fact, and thus meriting rational basis review).149
If a future court is unwilling to abandon R.J. Reynolds’s reasoning altogether, FDA can still argue that the court’s strong statements were specific
to the particular images before it, and it may be able to escape R.J Reynolds
by selecting images that convey health warning information without
reference to their associated textual warnings.
The R.J. Reynolds court was particularly bothered by three of FDA’s
selected images: the crying woman, the small child surrounded by a cloud
of smoke, and the man wearing a t-shirt bearing the words “I QUIT.”150
147 R.J. Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1231 (Rogers, J., dissenting).
148 Disc. Tobacco, 674 F.3d at 569.
149 Am. Meat Inst. v. USDA, 760 F.3d 18, 27 (D.C. Cir. 2014)

(en banc) (quoting Pac. Gas &
Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 475 U.S. 1, 16 n.12 (1986) (plurality opinion)). The court,
however, did acknowledge that “slaughter” “might convey a certain innuendo,” but because the
rule allowed retailers to use the term “harvested” instead, the court found “no claim” that the
disclosure requirement was “controversial in that sense.” Id.
150 R.J. Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1216-17 (majority opinion). These images accompanied the following
textual statements: (1) “WARNING: Tobacco smoke causes fatal lung disease in nonsmokers”
(crying woman); (2) “WARNING: TOBACCO SMOKE CAN HARM YOUR CHILDREN”
(small child); and (3) “WARNING: Quitting smoking now greatly reduces serious risks to your
health” (man with “I QUIT” t-shirt). See John D. Kraemer & Sabeeh A. Baig, Analysis of Legal and
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According to the court, these “inflammatory images” do not convey any
warning information, “cannot rationally be viewed as pure attempts to
convey information to consumers,” and are “unabashed attempts to evoke
emotion (and perhaps embarrassment) and browbeat consumers into quitting.”151
Figure 1: FDA’s Proposed Graphic Warnings152

FDA certainly should abandon the image of the man with the “I QUIT”
t-shirt because it does not “depict[] the negative health consequences of
smoking” as required by the Tobacco Control Act.153 And although the
images of the crying woman and small child arguably communicate the
negative consequences of smoking when the graphic warnings are considered together with their associated textual statements, the link between the
images and the textual statements is attenuated. It takes an inferential leap
to understand that the woman is crying because either she or a loved one
has fatal lung disease, and it takes a similar inferential leap to understand

Scientific Issues in Court Challenges to Graphic Tobacco Warnings, 45 AM. J. PREVENTIVE MED. 334,
335 fig.1 (2013); see also infra Figure 1 (reproducing the complete set of nine graphic warnings
proposed by FDA before R.J. Reynolds).
151 R.J. Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1216-17.
152 Kraemer & Baig, supra note 150, at 335 fig.1.
153 Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, Pub. L. No. 111-31, sec. 201, § 4(d),
123 Stat. 1776, 1845 (2009) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1333(d) (2012)).
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that the small child might be harmed by the smoke in the image. When
viewed in isolation, these images do not convey warning information and
therefore suffer from a substantial flaw, given that FDA’s rulemaking noted
the importance of using images to effectively communicate information to
people with poor English or literacy skills.154
FDA should choose unenhanced images that clearly, directly, and
independently depict the health warning information conveyed in the
warning’s textual statement. These warnings should, in the words of
American Meat Institute, be “directly informative of intrinsic characteristics of
the product.”155 In this manner, FDA may be able to rebut both reasons the R.J.
Reynolds court provided for concluding that the graphic cigarette warnings were
nonfactual and did not merit Zauderer rational basis review (potential
consumer misinterpretation, and undue focus on an emotional response).156
C. Satisfying Central Hudson
Even if FDA selects images that clearly, directly, and independently
depict the negative health consequences of smoking, a court following R.J.
Reynolds might still conclude that the warnings are beyond Zauderer’s scope.
This conclusion need not be a fatal blow to the revised graphic warnings,
however, because R.J. Reynolds misapplied Central Hudson’s intermediate
scrutiny test. Also, there are good arguments for applying a more relaxed
version of Central Hudson to graphic warnings aimed at reducing the
number one cause of preventable death in the United States. Finally, recent

154 Required Warnings for Cigarette Packages and Advertisements, 76 Fed. Reg. 36,628,
36,709 ( June 22, 2011).
155 Am. Meat Inst. v. USDA, 760 F.3d 18, 27 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (en banc).
156 The R.J. Reynolds majority dedicated surprisingly little space to assessing the requirement
that cigarette labels include the “1-800-QUIT-NOW” number. It simply said that the number
“hardly sounds like an unbiased source of information,” given the lack of accompanying explanation about the services provided on the hotline. R.J. Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1216.
The dissent, however, dedicated considerably more space to the constitutionality of the hotline
number but nonetheless concluded that it could not pass Central Hudson intermediate scrutiny. Id.
at 1236-37 (Rogers, J., dissenting). Judge Rogers reasoned that, although the hotline number’s
inclusion on the package directly served the substantial government interest in “assist[ing]
smokers in their cessation efforts,” less speech-restrictive means of achieving this goal existed and
were inadequately addressed by FDA. Id.
Given that the Tobacco Control Act does not actually require inclusion of the hotline number,
see supra note 116 and accompanying text, FDA should seriously consider how this additional
requirement might influence a court’s overall inquiry into the factual, unbiased, nonideological
nature of the entire graphic warning. Similarly, FDA should consider whether equally effective
but less speech-restrictive means exist to increase consumer awareness of cessation resources. See,
e.g., id. at 1236 (suggesting a package insert as an alternative).
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research efforts provide promising scientific evidence of graphic warnings’
ability to reduce tobacco consumption.
1. The Lack of Evidence Presented in R.J. Reynolds
R.J. Reynolds found FDA’s evidence supporting its claim that there was
an “‘international consensus’ surrounding the effectiveness of large graphic
warnings” to be woefully inadequate.157 The D.C. Circuit noted that the
Australian and Canadian studies FDA cited showed only that graphic
warnings caused people to think about quitting smoking or to attempt to
quit; the studies did not “show that the implementation of large graphic
warnings has actually led to a reduction in smoking rates.”158
When FDA did present evidence from countries that introduced graphic
cigarette warnings and saw an actual reduction in smoking rates, R.J.
Reynolds discounted FDA’s evidence by pointing to confounding factors.
The D.C. Circuit characterized the causal link between Canada’s graphic
warning requirement and decreased smoking rates in the years following
their implementation as “mere speculation and conjecture” because the
Canadian government also implemented other smoking control initiatives
(e.g., increased cigarette taxes and further restrictions on public smoking)
during this period.159 FDA did not help matters by conceding in its proposed rulemaking that it could not directly attribute any decrease in the
Canadian smoking rate to graphic warnings.160
Finally, the R.J. Reynolds court pointed to the Regulatory Impact Analysis
accompanying FDA’s final regulation, which estimated that graphic warnings
would reduce U.S. smoking rates by a mere 0.088%.161 To the court, this
paltry statistic was yet another factor showing FDA’s failure “to present any
data” proving the regulation would directly advance its goal.162 But the
court failed to mention FDA’s reference to a Canadian study of young
smokers, where 22.6% of males and 26.6% of females reported that graphic
cigarette warnings caused them not to have a cigarette in the past month.163
While restricting is not the same as quitting, evidence that an individual
157 Id. at 1219 (majority opinion).
158 Id.
159 Id. (quoting Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 487 (1995)).
160 Id.
161 Id. at 1220 (citing Required Warnings for Cigarette Packages and Advertisements,

76 Fed.
Reg. 36,628, 36,721 ( June 22, 2011)).
162 Id. at 1220-22.
163 Required Warnings for Cigarette Packages and Advertisements, 75 Fed. Reg. 69,524,
69,532 (proposed Nov. 12, 2010).
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reduced his cigarette consumption would certainly seem relevant to FDA’s
goal to reduce tobacco consumption.164 Nonetheless, the R.J. Reynolds court
concluded that FDA failed to present requisite evidence to show the graphic
warnings directly advanced FDA’s government interest.165 The court thus
did not reach the third prong of Central Hudson, which asks whether the
speech regulation is narrowly tailored to achieve the governmental interest.166
2. R.J. Reynolds Demanded Too Much
Although R.J. Reynolds correctly questioned the sufficiency of FDA’s
evidence, the court applied a stricter standard than necessary under the
“directly advance” prong of Central Hudson.167 The court quoted several
Supreme Court cases to establish that FDA had to do more than provide
“only ineffective or remote support” for its methods and that FDA could
not “satisfy its burden by mere speculation or conjecture.”168
The D.C. Circuit did not, however, use any case law to clarify exactly
what level of evidence was actually necessary to satisfy Central Hudson.169
Instead, the court misapplied the APA’s “substantial evidence” standard to
its First Amendment analysis.170 In doing so, the court failed to appreciate
the considerable distance between “mere speculation or conjecture” and the
unattainable standard it set: the requirement of airtight evidence that a

164 See generally Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, Pub. L. No. 111-31,
sec. 101(b), § 906(d), 123 Stat. 1776, 1796-97 (2009) (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 387f(d) (2012))
(granting FDA discretion to promulgate regulations to protect the public health, with special
consideration given to whether the regulations will result in “increased . . . likelihood that existing
users of tobacco will stop using such products”).
165 R.J. Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1222.
166 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 564-65 (1980)
(requiring speech restrictions to be “narrowly drawn” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
167 See id. at 566 (“[W]e must determine whether the regulation directly advances the
governmental interest asserted.”).
168 See R.J. Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1218-19 (quoting Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476,
487 (1995), and Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 770 (1993)).
169 Id. at 1217-21.
170 The court noted that the APA requires it to “hold unlawful and set aside agency action,
findings, and conclusions found to be . . . unsupported by substantial evidence,” and it then
grafted the APA’s “substantial evidence” requirement on to Central Hudson’s “directly advance”
prong. Id. at 1218 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (2012)); id. at 1219-22.
As an initial matter, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E), the APA’s “substantial evidence” test, is a separate
challenge to an agency’s formal rulemaking or adjudication. RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ET AL.,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS 321 (6th ed. 2014). It has nothing to do with a First
Amendment challenge. Moreover, the APA’s “substantial evidence test accords considerable
deference to agency findings of fact.” Id. at 322.
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graphic warning by itself will “directly cause[] a material decrease in
smoking rates.”171
Central Hudson has been criticized for being “difficult to apply in a
consistent and predictable manner,” and courts disagree about the level of
protection that it affords commercial speech.172 Compounding the uncertainty, the Court has used Central Hudson almost exclusively for commercial
speech restrictions, but its recent Central Hudson analysis in Sorrell v. IMS
Health (a 2011 case involving a commercial speech restriction for pharmaceutical
companies that was intended to promote public health) muddied the water
by blurring the line between commercial and core First Amendment
speech.173 The Supreme Court cases most directly on point exemplify the
Court’s inconsistent application of Central Hudson: Lorillard Tobacco Co. v.
Reilly struck down Massachusetts regulations prohibiting any smokeless
tobacco or cigar advertising within one thousand feet of schools or playgrounds,
despite the Massachusetts Attorney General’s “ample documentation of the
problem with underage use of smokeless tobacco and cigars.”174 In contrast,
the plurality opinion of 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island invalidated
Rhode Island’s ban on advertising the price of alcoholic beverages but was
far less accepting of evidence produced by the state.175
Although Lorillard ultimately held that Massachusetts’s tobacco advertising
ban violated tobacco manufacturers’ First Amendment rights, the Supreme
Court concluded that the state had produced sufficient evidence showing
the restriction directly advanced its goal of preventing underage tobacco
use.176 Massachusetts supported its position with evidence linking tobacco
advertising practices to underage tobacco use.177 It pointed to studies and
171 R.J. Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1219 (emphasis omitted).
172 Keighley, supra note 95, at 565 & n.129 (citing Alex

Kozinski & Stuart Banner, Who’s
Afraid of Commercial Speech?, 76 VA. L. REV. 627, 630-31 (1990), and Robert Post, The Constitutional
Status of Commercial Speech, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1, 42 (2000)).
173 See Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2664-68 (2011). The Court’s analysis in
Thompson v. Western States Medical Center (another case about a commercial speech restriction for
pharmaceutical companies intended to promote public health) was far more faithful to Central
Hudson, but it was no more instructive on the “directly advance” prong of Central Hudson. See 535
U.S. 357, 370-77 (2002). The Court struck down the law’s prohibition on advertising compounded
drugs because the speech restriction was more extensive than necessary, even while assuming it
might indeed directly advance the government’s interests. Id. at 371.
174 533 U.S. 525, 561 (2001).
175 517 U.S. 484, 505-08 (1996) (plurality opinion).
176 Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 556-561. The advertising restriction failed the final prong of Central
Hudson because Massachusetts did not show its restriction was no more extensive than necessary.
Id. at 561-66.
177 Id. at 557-60.
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Supreme Court precedent supporting the theory that advertising stimulates
demand, while suppressing advertisements may have the opposite effect.178
Massachusetts also pointed to FDA findings that an overwhelming majority
of Americans start using tobacco products prior to adulthood and that
advertising plays a crucial role in these decisions.179 In addition, Massachusetts’s
evidence included reports by the Surgeon General and Institute of Medicine
finding “sufficient evidence to conclude that advertising and labeling play a
significant and important contributory role in a young person’s decision to
use cigarettes or smokeless tobacco products.” 180 The state also cited
evidence documenting smokeless tobacco sales, advertising techniques
targeting youth, an attendant increase in younger smokeless tobacco users,
and the link between advertising and demand for cigars.181 Notably, Lorillard
did not require Massachusetts to provide any evidence showing that
restrictions on tobacco advertisements actually prevented underage tobacco
use.182 Rather, all the state had to show was that tobacco advertisements
were partially responsible for the youth tobacco use problem.183
The 44 Liquormart plurality opinion, on the other hand, demanded
considerably more from Rhode Island to support its ban on advertising the
price of alcoholic beverages. In a portion of the opinion joined only by
Justices Kennedy, Souter, and Ginsburg, Justice Stevens concluded that the
price advertising ban failed Central Hudson because the state provided no
evidentiary support whatsoever to show its ban would significantly advance
its interest in reducing alcohol consumption. 184 Although Rhode Island
presented evidence that the price advertising ban might have “some impact
on the purchasing patterns of temperate drinkers of modest means,” Justice
Stevens found this evidence insufficient.185 The state, he noted, had “presented
no evidence to suggest that its speech prohibition w[ould] significantly

178 Id. at 557.
179 Id. at 557-58.
180 Id. at 558 (internal

quotation marks omitted). The data showed that (1) children smoke
fewer cigarette brands than adults, and tend to choose more heavily advertised brands; (2) the
majority of children recognize Joe Camel, and after his introduction, Camel’s share of the youth
market rose from 4% to 13%; and (3) trends in tobacco consumption in a certain population
correlate with the introduction and marketing of products to that population. Id. at 558-59.
181 Id. at 559-61.
182 See id. at 556-61.
183 See id. at 561 (finding that Massachusetts’s evidence was sufficient because the Court was
“unable to conclude that the Attorney General’s decision to regulate advertising of smokeless
tobacco and cigars . . . was based on mere speculation and conjecture” (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
184 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 505 (1996) (plurality opinion).
185 Id. at 506.
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reduce marketwide consumption.” 186 Justice Stevens seemed to require
evidence showing that the ban would reduce alcohol consumption among all
groups; he emphasized “the evidence suggest[ed] that the abusive drinker
will probably not be deterred by a marginal price increase, and that the true
alcoholic may simply reduce his purchases of other necessities.”187
A court evaluating the inevitable First Amendment challenge to FDA’s
revised graphic cigarette warnings should look to the Court’s analysis in
Lorillard for guidance rather than to the comparable analysis in 44 Liquormart.
In 44 Liquormart, the link between Rhode Island’s speech restriction and its
goal of reducing alcohol consumption was attenuated. The success of Rhode
Island’s speech ban hinged on assumptions about the economic decisionmaking process and behavior of two distinct groups: alcohol manufacturers
and consumers. Rhode Island’s price advertising ban was intended to
prevent alcohol manufacturers from competing on the basis of price—which
in theory would keep alcohol prices higher, thereby reducing demand (and
consumption) across all alcohol consumer groups. 188 The logic behind
FDA’s graphic cigarette warnings is more direct: as in Lorillard, the regulations involve presumptions about how information (about the health risks
or pleasures of tobacco products) influences consumers’ decision to smoke.
According to FDA, given the ample evidence that smokers (especially
adolescents) smoke in part because they underestimate the personal health
risks of smoking, closing the information gap with graphic warnings will
motivate and empower smokers to quit, thereby decreasing tobacco
consumption.189 The link between the regulation and the intended effect
involves just one intermediary (consumers), instead of two (manufacturers
and consumers). 44 Liquormart’s analysis should not apply to graphic
cigarette warnings.
Further, even if FDA’s graphic cigarette warnings failed to materially
decrease tobacco consumption, the means through which FDA hoped to
achieve this goal (informing consumers of the health risks of smoking)
served an independently important government interest; 190 the speech
186 Id.
187 Id.
188 Id. at 505.
189 R.J. Reynolds

Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205, 1209 (D.C. Cir. 2012), overruled in part
by Am. Meat Inst. v. USDA, 760 F.3d 18 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (en banc).
190 This statement does not mean to contend that promoting consumer knowledge of smoking
risks alone is enough to satisfy Central Hudson, a position adopted (and overstated) by the R.J.
Reynolds dissent. See id. at 1235-36 (Rogers, J., dissenting) (“The government’s informational
interest in effectively conveying the negative health consequences of smoking clearly qualifies as
‘substantial’ under the second prong of Central Hudson.”). Judge Rogers cited Edenfield v. Fane for
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restriction in 44 Liquormart did not. While FDA’s graphic cigarette warnings
are designed to curb smoking by giving consumers more information,
Rhode Island’s alcohol price advertising ban sought to achieve its goal by
keeping consumers in the dark. The Court in 44 Liquormart emphasized
several times that it was important to apply a demanding review because
Rhode Island was restricting accurate commercial information.191 Even if a
court applies Central Hudson because it determines that the graphic cigarette
warnings are not the “purely factual and uncontroversial” disclosures to
which Zauderer applies, the warnings still promote—rather than block—the
flow of factual information. 192 A commercial speaker—whose speech is
protected in the first place because of the information it provides to
consumers193—is more burdened by a speech restriction than by a mandate to
disclose accurate (albeit emotionally evocative) information about its product.194
Most importantly, smoking, the public health problem both Lorillard
and FDA’s graphic cigarette warnings seek to attack, is the number one
the proposition that “there is no question that [the government’s] interest in ensuring the accuracy
of commercial information in the marketplace is substantial.” Id. at 1235 (quoting Edenfield v.
Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 769 (1993)). But Edenfield recognized a substantial state interest in ensuring
the accuracy of commercial information already in the marketplace, not in injecting additional
accurate information into the marketplace—especially where there is insufficient evidence that the
existing information is inaccurate. Edenfield, 507 U.S. at 768-69. Moreover, if a court applying
Central Hudson has already determined that the mandate is not “purely factual and accurate,” using
an “information interest” to satisfy Central Hudson—a considerably easier task than showing the
mandate reduces smoking rates—appears to be an end-run around First Amendment requirements.
191 See 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 499, 501 (explaining that “the State retains less regulatory
authority when its commercial speech restrictions strike at the substance of the information
communicated” and “complete speech bans . . . are particularly dangerous because they foreclose
alternative means of disseminating certain information” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
192 See R.J. Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1229 (Rogers, J., dissenting) (“The tobacco companies do not
challenge the factual accuracy of the textual statements included in the warning labels.”).
193 See supra notes 28-31 and accompanying text.
194 Tobacco manufacturers argued that the message of the graphic warnings was “ideological
and not informational” because the images “shame and repulse smokers and denigrate smoking as
an antisocial act.” R.J. Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1211 (majority opinion). While FDA’s warnings do
contain disturbing images that accurately depict the gruesome consequences of smoking, see supra
Figure 1, the images do not make the warnings any more “ideological” than the textual warnings
tobacco manufacturers accepted as accurate; the images simply make the warnings more likely to
be noticed and remembered. Although it can be argued that FDA’s graphic warnings use cigarette
packages to promote “the government’s anti-smoking message,” R.J. Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1212, the
same can be said of the textual warnings that have been on cigarettes for the past five decades. See
supra note 4 and accompanying text. And it is beside the point that the graphic images undermine
the manufacturers’ “own economic interest,” R.J. Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1212: the disclosure
requirement approved in Zauderer, which lessened the appeal of attorneys’ contingency-fee rates,
did as well. See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 633, 650-63 (1985)
(upholding a state rule requiring the attorneys’ contingent-fee advertisements to disclose “whether
percentages are computed before or after deduction of court costs and expenses” (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
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preventable cause of death in the United States.195 It kills approximately
443,000 Americans each year.196 The Supreme Court has stated that smoking
poses “perhaps the single most significant threat to public health in the
United States.” 197 Smoking is a serious public health problem because
nicotine is highly addictive198 and because, for decades, cigarette manufacturers
lured smokers in at a young age before they could fully appreciate the
health consequences of this highly addictive habit.199 Substantial evidence
exists showing a persistent information gap, particularly among adolescents.200
People underestimate the personal health risks of smoking, fail to appreciate
the highly addictive nature of cigarettes, and remain ignorant about the
harmful effects of secondhand smoke on others.201
Because smoking is a public health problem of such great magnitude and
importance, involves a highly addictive product, and carries with it great
harms that consumers still fail to fully appreciate, courts should apply a
relaxed version of Central Hudson when evaluating a graphic warning that
accurately depicts smoking’s health consequences. The government should
not have to prove that a disclosure requirement alone would significantly
reduce marketwide tobacco consumption. It certainly should not be required
to provide evidence that the graphic warning will significantly reduce
tobacco consumption among those with greatest dependency on this highly
addictive product, as 44 Liquormart suggests.202 To demand proof before
implementation that a graphic cigarette warning significantly reduces

195 See Kraemer & Baig, supra note 150, at 334 (warning that smoking causes more U.S. deaths
per year “than any other modifiable risk factor”).
196 Id.
197 FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 161 (2000).
198 See OFFICE OF SMOKING & HEALTH, U.S. DEP’ T OF HEALTH & H UMAN SERVS.,
DHHS PUB. NO. (CDC) 88-8406, THE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF SMOKING: NICOTINE
ADDICTION 149 (1988) (“Basic observations and experimental research indicate that cigarette
smoking is not a random or capricious behavior that simply occurs at the will of those who smoke.
Rather, smoking is the result of behavioral and pharmacologic factors that lead to highly
controlled or compulsive use of cigarettes.”).
199 See Regulations Restricting the Sale and Distribution of Cigarettes and Smokeless Tobacco
to Protect Children and Adolescents, 61 Fed. Reg. 44,396, 44,398 (Aug. 28, 1996) (“Most people
who suffer the adverse health consequences of using cigarettes and smokeless tobacco begin their
use before they reach the age of 18, an age when they are not prepared for, or equipped to, make a
decision that, for many, will have lifelong consequences.”).
200 See R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Corp. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205, 1228 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (Rogers,
J., dissenting) (“[A]dolescents in particular fail to appreciate the highly addictive nature of
cigarettes.”), overruled in part by Am. Meat Inst. v. USDA, 760 F.3d 18 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (en banc).
201 Id.
202 See supra note 187 and accompanying text.
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smoking rates203 is not only unfeasible but also contrary to the government’s
interest in promoting public health.204
Instead, it should be sufficient for FDA to provide evidence that the
graphic warnings are likely to encourage a significant number of smokers to
reduce their cigarette consumption. If FDA can provide evidence that
smokers who are better informed of smoking’s health risks and have an
increased desire to quit205 are more likely to successfully quit (or reduce
their cigarette consumption), then FDA’s graphic warnings should be able
to pass judicial scrutiny. FDA should thus be able to satisfy any First
Amendment burdens with rigorous scientific studies showing that the
graphic warnings increase consumers’ knowledge of the health consequences
of smoking and strengthen their desire to quit. This information could be
supplemented with data from other countries showing a decrease in smoking
rates after the implementation of similar graphic warning labels (even if
other anti-smoking initiatives were advanced at the same time).206
Even if graphic cigarette warnings might be effective only in conjunction
with other regulatory efforts to reduce smoking rates, that fact should not
be an obstacle to satisfying Central Hudson. Given the severity of the
smoking problem, legislative and regulatory bodies certainly should be
using additional smoking control initiatives (e.g., increased cigarette taxes
and further restrictions on public smoking) to reduce tobacco consumption.
If the courts interpret Central Hudson to demand an evidentiary standard
that is harder to satisfy when a legislature attacks a problem through multiple
channels, the resulting regime disadvantages regulators seeking to alleviate
complex problems. Such a regime poses a particular problem for public health
law and especially for tobacco control, where a multifaceted approach involving
multiple public health strategies and regulatory initiatives is often necessary.207

203 See R.J. Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1221 (majority opinion) (“Central Hudson requires FDA to
find and present data supporting its claims prior to imposing a burden on commercial speech.”).
204 See generally 21 U.S.C. § 387f(d) (2012) (emphasizing FDA’s discretion to promulgate
regulations as “appropriate for the protection of the public health”).
205 See R.J. Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1219 (discussing FDA’s existing evidence showing that graphic
warnings increase smokers’ thoughts of quitting and attempts to quit).
206 Contra id. (dismissing FDA’s argument that the Canadian smoking rate decreased after
graphic warnings were introduced in Canada, “because the Canadian government implemented
other smoking control initiatives” concurrently).
207 See generally Corinne G. Husten & Lawrence R. Deyton, Understanding the Tobacco Control
Act: Efforts by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration to Make Tobacco Morbidity and Mortality Part of
the USA’s Past, Not Its Future, 381 LANCET 1570, 1578 (2013) (“It is only with the full implementation of both traditional public health strategies and new regulatory authorities that we will ensure
that tobacco-related morbidity and mortality is part of the USA’s past, not its future.”).
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More specifically, as long as FDA can provide evidence that graphic
warnings close the information gap and that consumers equipped with
better information are more likely to reduce or eliminate their tobacco
consumption, FDA should be able to rely on the evidence of the association
between Canada’s implementation of a graphic warning requirement and
decreased Canadian smoking rates in the following years. 208 Given the
Supreme Court’s analysis in Lorillard, this level of evidence surely
satisfies the government’s burden of providing more than “mere speculation
or conjecture.”209
Further, the Supreme Court has appeared to be principally concerned
about speech restrictions at odds with other regulations (i.e., an inconsistent
and irrational regulatory regime that cuts against the state’s asserted
interest), rather than about informative disclosure requirements that work
in conjunction with other regulations to achieve the state’s important and
ambitious goal (e.g., future FDA-mandated graphic cigarette warnings).
This rationale undergirds Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., where the Supreme
Court sustained an alcohol manufacturer’s First Amendment challenge to
the Federal Alcohol Administration Act (FAAA).210 The Court took issue
with the FAAA regulations because the statute prohibited disclosure of
alcohol content on product labels unless disclosure was required by state
law—but FAAA regulations prohibited these disclosures only if affirmatively
prohibited by state law.211 This “overall irrationality”—not the government’s
claim that the FAAA reduced pressure to market beer on the basis of alcohol
content, thereby lowering beer alcohol levels—was FAAA’s fatal flaw.212
When it comes to factual disclosure requirements, courts should
move away from the standard set by R.J. Reynolds, where more complex
problems and more ambitious government goals make it harder for a
government-mandated disclosure requirement to pass constitutional muster.
As shown in this subsection, a court may stray from R.J. Reynolds’s overly
strict application of Central Hudson without breaking from Supreme Court
precedent. Although the evidence before R.J. Reynolds would not have been

208 See R.J. Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1219 (“In 2001, the year the warnings were introduced, the
[Canadian] smoking rate dropped [from 24 percent] to 22 percent, and it further dropped to 21
percent in 2002.”).
209 R.J. Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1219 (quoting Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 487
(1995)); see also supra notes 174, 176-183 and accompanying text (discussing the Supreme Court’s
more lenient evidentiary standard in Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001)).
210 Rubin, 514 U.S. at 478.
211 Id. at 488.
212 Id.
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enough to satisfy the standard advocated here, researchers continue to build
a strong scientific body of evidence showing that graphic cigarette warnings
are likely to reduce tobacco consumption.
3. New Evidence
In the wake of the R.J. Reynolds decision, FDA and the National Institutes
of Health (NIH) created fourteen Tobacco Centers of Regulatory Science.213
Billed as “first-of-kind,” these regulatory centers are designed to “generate
research to inform the regulation of tobacco products to protect public
health”214 and to “ensure that U.S. tobacco regulatory actions and activities
are based on sound and relevant scientific evidence”215—a mission that
heeds R.J. Reynolds’s warning. NIH’s Tobacco Centers Research Portfolio
page reveals promising studies that could provide the necessary proof of
graphic warnings’ effectiveness. 216 One study will expose participating
smokers to different warning labels (graphic versus standard text) and
monitor their smoking behavior and cigarette risk beliefs over fifty days.217
Another looks at whether ingredient labels on cigarette packages “alter
cessation behavior,” and at which labels “most effectively increase adult
smokers’ cessation behaviors (quitting, attempting to quit, or smoking fewer
cigarettes),” especially among minority populations. 218 Still another will
focus on adolescents and young adults, identifying how pro- and anti-tobacco
media and warning labels “influence perceptions of risks, benefits, acceptability,
and subsequent tobacco use.”219 R.J. Reynolds criticized FDA for its heavy
reliance on evidence that graphic warnings increased smokers’ desire to
213 FDA and NIH Create First-of-Kind Tobacco Centers of Regulatory Science, NAT’L INSTS. OF
HEALTH (Sept. 19, 2013, 12:30 PM), http://www.nih.gov/news/health/sep2013/od-19.htm, archived
at http://perma.cc/SVC4-ZN3M.
214 Id.
215 Centers Research Portfolio, NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH , https://prevention.nih.gov/tobaccoregulatory-science-program/research-portfolio/centers (last updated Mar. 26, 2014), archived at
http://perma.cc/QH4Q-ZJLS.
216 See id. (listing studies investigating topics such as “Informing and Correcting Perceptions
Regarding Tobacco Products in Young Adults” and “Communicating the Risks of Harmful
Cigarette Smoke Constituents”).
217 Andrew A. Strasser, Abstract: Tobacco Product Messaging in a Complex Communication
Environment, NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH, https://prevention.nih.gov/docs/trsp/rfa-da-13-003/
webinar/strasser.pdf (last visited Dec. 16, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/Y5PY-XGHM.
218 Noel T. Brewer, Abstract: Effective Communication on Tobacco Product Risk and FDA Authority, NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH, https://prevention.nih.gov/docs/trsp/rfa-da-13-003/webinar/
brewer.pdf (last visited Dec. 16, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/4LJJ-KQAF.
219 Pamela Ling, Abstract: Improved Models to Inform Tobacco Product Regulation, NAT’L INSTS.
OF HEALTH, https://prevention.nih.gov/docs/trsp/rfa-da-13-003/webinar/ling.pdf (last visited Dec.
16, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/LD4K-F5RQ.
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quit,220 but a future court may find this evidence persuasive if supplemented
with evidence showing a strong link between behavioral intent and action.
Additionally, in the two years since the D.C. Circuit invalidated FDA’s
graphic warnings, new scientific evidence has already emerged showing that
graphic cigarette warnings “prevent smoking initiation and promote
cessation.” 221 According to a recent Canadian study, graphic warnings
reduced smoking odds by approximately twelve percent and quit attempts
by a third.222 Another Canadian study found that “people for whom warning
labels were more noticeable and salient were more likely to have quit or
reduced smoking.” 223 These research trends are promising and instill
confidence that, by the time FDA issues its revised graphic cigarette
warnings, the government will have amassed the scientific evidence necessary
to overcome another First Amendment challenge.224
CONCLUSION
R.J. Reynolds narrowed the scope of Zauderer rational basis review
protection, while ratcheting up Central Hudson intermediate scrutiny to
closely resemble strict scrutiny, thereby threatening the viability of public
health disclosures and warnings by demanding an unattainable level of
certainty and precision. In American Meat Institute, the D.C. Circuit seized
the opportunity to preserve the current regulatory state and avoid administrative complexity by overruling R.J. Reynolds and extending Zauderer
rational basis review to mandates beyond those curing deception. Despite
this victory for regulators, FDA still faces a formidable challenge in selecting revised graphic cigarette warnings. FDA can overcome the obstacle R.J.
Reynolds presents by selecting unenhanced images that clearly, directly, and
independently convey the health risk information described in the accompanying textual warning, by arguing that R.J. Reynolds misapplied Central
220 R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205, 1219 (D.C. Cir. 2012), overruled in part
by Am. Meat Inst. v. USDA, 760 F.3d 18 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (en banc).
221 Kraemer & Baig, supra note 150, at 338.
222 Id.
223 Id.
224 The final prong of Central Hudson—whether the speech regulation is “excessive”—was not
addressed by R.J. Reynolds, but it should not pose a barrier for graphic cigarette warnings. See
Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 564 (1980) (“[I]f the
governmental interest could be served as well by a more limited restriction on commercial speech,
the excessive restrictions cannot survive.”). As the R.J. Reynolds dissent noted, “[t]he failures of
previous government efforts to convey the relevant information through small, textual warnings
on the side of cigarette packages” shows that graphic images are no more extensive than necessary.
R.J. Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1236 (Rogers, J., dissenting).
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Hudson, and by bolstering its evidence of graphic cigarette warnings’
effectiveness.
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